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MANUFACTURER'S NEGLIGENCE IN PRODUCTS
LIABILITY CASES
GIBSON B. WITHERSPOON*
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
During the past thirty-three years, Judge Cardozo's statement
in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,' "The assault upon the .citadel of
privity is proceeding in these 'clays apace," has often been quoted in
products liability cases. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,' decided
in 1916, was the case which began the great assault. The court therein
held, Cardozo again writing: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is
reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril when negligently made,
it is then a thing of danger"' and the manufacturer should be held lia-
ble without the need for privity of contract. This early case left an in-
delible imprint upon the law of products liability. Although its doctrine
was extended slowly, each decade has produced additional wreckage in
the fortifications defending "the citadel." On the plaintiff's side, these
extensions have included recovery of property damage' (even where it
was caused by such chattels as animal food, involving no recognizable
risk of personal injuries)? Protection has even been afforded to such
persons beyond the original purchaser as his employees,° the members
of his family,' subsequent purchasers,' and other users of the chattels.°
Even bystanders' and others "in the vicinity of its probable use"' are
now within the scope of protection. On the defendant's side, the doc-
trine has been broadened to include makers of component parts,'
assemblers of parts,'' those who put their names upon goods made by
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1 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (1931).
2 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
3 Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1053.
4 Gosnell v. Zink, 325 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1958).
5 Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn. App. 229, 272 S.W.2d 479 (1954).
6 Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923).
7 Baker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Cal. 1936).
8 Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div..433, 153 N.Y.S. 131 (1915).
9 Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 III. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d 714 (1937).
10 McLeod v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 318 Mo. 397, 1 S.W.2d 122 (1927).
11 Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
12 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932)..
18 Sheward v. Virtue, 20 Cal. 2d 410, 126 P.2d 345 (1942).
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others," sellers who were not and did not purport to be manufacturers
at all,' repairmen who do work on the chattel' and, in most jurisdic-
tions, contractors.'? Given this increased coverage, it is now a general
rule that negligence liability will be imposed upon any supplier of
a chattel for remuneration."' However, gratuitous lenders, bailors and
donors are still held to have no duty to inspect before delivery of the
chattel. They are liable only for a failure to disclose those defects of
which they have knowledge and which may make the product danger-
ous to a third person."'
An exception to the general rule occurs where the user, because
of the experience of his profession, should have known of the danger.
If so, the producer will not be held liable. This problem has often
arisen with regard to the sale to physicians of medicine, supplies and
equipment. The courts have been uniform in holding that the physician
should have known the nature of the purchase and need not have been
warned. 20
This author recently participated in a case in which it was
alleged that a blood bank had supplied blood without sufficient warn-
ing of the dangers to those who have had numerous transfusions.
When the patient had a violent reaction, the trial court held that since
the blood bank delivered blood to physicians and hospitals as ordered
before the blood was administered to patients, it was the doctor, not
the blood bank, who was under the duty to warn the patient. This
case was not appealed, but was settled by the doctors who were sued
jointly for negligence.
THE PRESENT TREND
In recent years circumstantial evidence has been increasingly
deemed sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the manufac-
turer and the assembler whose name appears on the product. Although
the maxim "Caveat emptor" is far from dead,2 ' since 1915 the tide
of the law has shifted increasingly toward protection of the buyer or
"ultimate consumer." Indeed, with such products as new or used auto-
mobiles, it is now the manufacturer who must beware ("Caveat ven-
ditor") if his product proves defective. Suits against him have usually
14 Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 174 Miss. 253, 164 So. 231 (1935).
15 Jones v. Raney Chevrolet Co., 217 N.C. 693, 9 S.E.2d 395 (1940).
10 Dahms v. General Elevator Co., 214 Cal. 733, 7 P.2d 1013 (1932).
17 Wright v. Holland Furnace Co., 186 Minn. 265, 243 N.W. 387 (1932).
18 Nelson v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 20 N.J. Super. 198, 89 A.2d 445 (1952).
19 Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 759, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
20 Johnson v. H. M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 251, 111 Atl. 70 (1920).
21 But cf. Comment, Federal Regulation of False Advertising, 5 B.C. Ind. & Corn.
L. Rev. 704, 705 (1964).
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been successfully prosecuted." As Page Keeton, Dean of the University
of Texas Law School, has pointed out,' "Liability of a manufacturer
of a product may be imposed upon one of three theories: (a) negli-
gence; (b) breach of implied warranty or breach of duty independent
of the contract to provide a fit product without respect to fault; and
(c) breach of an expressed warranty."
Recent decisions involving an express warranty theory are attrib-
utable to the ingenuity of plaintiff's counsel in finding representations
constituting express warranties in letters, in personal conversations
by agents or manufacturers, on labels on the product, in brochures
and in advertisements and commercials. These decisions indicate the
judicial adoption of a policy requiring the manufacturer to stand
behihd his inducements to the public to buy." Liability in cases not
involving a breach of warranty theory of liability depends on proof
of negligence. Generally, the main obstacle to recovery is not the sub-
stantive law relating to duty or causation, but it is the unavailability
of sufficient evidence of negligence to establish a prima facie case. A
theory of recovery based on a warranty, however, is not subject to
this disadvantage. A user need merely show that an injury was sus-
tained either in the course of his use or shortly thereafter, that the
injury is attributable to the product and that this is a breach of the
express or implied warranty.
The problem of a manufacturer's liability for physical harm suf-
fered by a supersensitive or an allergic plaintiff has been presented
with increasing frequency. Generally, mere proof of an injurious
reaction is insufficient because the plaintiff may have had a temporary
or unusual condition. The plaintiff must show not only that an appre-
ciable number of people were allergic to some substance in the product,
but also that the plaintiff was a member of this class. A recent case
involving the use of a deodorant illustrates this dual requirement.
The plaintiff, suing in negligence and fraud, proved that a certain
number of people were allergic to the aluminum sulfate used in the
product and that he suffered injuries from it. The court held that the
plaintiff had no further burden in order to establish a prima facie case
and that the burden then shifted to the manufacturer to justify his
ignorance of the danger or to indicate that proper warnings and in-
22 Chew, The Swing Grows for Products That Are Faulty, The National Observer,
Jan. 14, 1963, p. 21, col. 3.
23 Keeton, Products Liability, 49 Va. L. Rev. 676 (1963), citing Rogers v. Toni
Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958) and Worley v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952).
24 See Bonowski v. Revlon, Inc., 251 Iowa 141, 100 N.W.2d 5 (1958) (suntan
lotion) and the lung cancer cases[,] Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70
(5th Cir. 1962) and Prichard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
(1961).
587
BOSTON 'COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
structions had been given." Note that this type of negligence does
not, of course, extend to a retail seller of the product.
The following test has been suggested: "A product is . . . fit for
the general purpose intended, if a reasonable man with full knowledge
of all the properties and the danger therein would continue to market
the product because the utility of its use outweighs the dangers!" 2e
An example of the application of this rule is found in the polio vac-
cine case, where two innoculated children contracted polio because
of the live and active poliomyelitis virus in the vaccine. The court
properly imposed liability, finding that the vaccine was not wholesome
and, therefore, neither merchantable nor fit for its intended purpose?'
While there was no negligence in distributing the vaccine, since science
had developed a method to remove the live virus from the vaccine,
reasonable men would not continue marketing the vaccine unless the
live virus were eliminated from it.
At this point, the rationale for holding the manufacturer of food
and drugs to such seemingly strict (i.e., without fault) liability may
be questioned. Perhaps the best answer is found in Judge Traynor's
concurring opinion in Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.: 28 "The cost
of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelming
misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public as a cost of doing business."
A recent case illustrates the application of this socialistic con-
cept. 2° A plaintiff who used a hair dye suffered a systemic reaction
of an extremely violent nature. It was known that an ingredient in
the defendant's product could cause allergic skin reaction in a number
of people. The plaintiff had used this dye every six weeks for two
and a half years. Doctors for both parties agreed that the plaintiff's
dread disease was from an unknown cause, and that never before in
medical history had this disease been associated with hair dye. The
court held that a jury could have found that defendant's product
caused plaintiff's injury. Another example of the standard of proof
necessary under this modern concept of liability, founded upon manu-
facturer's ability to spread his losses, arose during a drilling operation
in Texas. The plaintiff was injured when a charge of dynamite exploded
prematurely. The dynamite was being handled by a fellow-servant
who was killed. The particular charge was composed of three dif-
25 Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957) (makers of Arrid).
26 Keeton, Products Liability—Current Developments, 40 Texas L. Rev. 193, 210
(1961).
21 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rep. 320 (1960).
28 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944).
See Hadley v. Hillcrest Dairy, Inc., 341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961).
22 Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
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ferent elements, each manufactured by a different defendant. Plaintiff
was unable to prove any negligence and was unable to produce any
evidence that any of the three elements were defective. The court
held that the explosion spoke for itself, that it was enough to shift
the burden of proof to defendants and that it raised a jury question
as to whether one or more of them should be liable."
THE REQUIREMENT OF FORESEEABILITY OF DANGER
One of the most widely expanding areas in the field of products
liability arises out of the manufacturer's duty to warn. The defendant's
product may be perfectly made, but may still be dangerous to some
consumers in either normal use or such abnormal use as is foreseeable.
The defendant manufacturer is usually held to have a duty to warn
the public of whatever danger there may lie in his product. Warning
to the retailer is not sufficient; it must be delivered to the ultimate
consumer. This duty to warn depends upon the foreseeability of the
danger. Therefore, the typical defense is that the danger was not fore-
seeable and, consequently, the manufacturer's duty to warn against
it did not arise.
As a practical proposition, the courts have had little or no diffi-
culty in applying the foreseeability theory. A typical case arose when
a plaintiff applied a balm to his chest, put on his pajamas, lighted a
cigarette, and was injured by the flash flame resulting from the ignition
of vapors accumulated between his chest and the pajama tops. There
was no warning on the label and the balm would not ignite at an
ordinary temperature. The evidence proved that the fire was possible
only because of the air space between the pajamas and the plaintiff's
body. The court held that the manufacturer should have known that
the consumer would smoke while wearing clothing and that he there-
fore had a duty to warn of the explosive nature of the fumes of his
product."
Of course, liability is easily cast upon the makers of such products
as a threshing machine, which had over its blades a catwalk of such
thin metal that a man of normal weight caused its collapse ; 32 a party
dress that burst into flame upon the slightest touch of a cigarette;"
a grinding wheel which flew apart while revolving at the prescribed
speed" and a refrigerator which gave off carbon monoxide." All of
these examples are taken from cases which permitted recovery because
the inherent dangers appeared in the course of the usual use of the
85 Dement v. Mathieson Chem. Corp., 282 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1960).
81 Martin v. Benque, Inc., 25 N.J. 359, 136 A.2d 626 (1957).
82 Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
33 Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 268 App. Div. 149, 49 N.Y.S.2d 460 (1944).
34 Tomao v. A. P. DeSanno & Son, Inc., 209 F.2d 544 (3d Cir. 1954).
35 Beadle v. Serve!, Inc., 344 III. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951).
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product. It is not hard to find many other examples where the fore-
seeability is clear and liability thus logically follows. It has been held
that when a plaintiff establishes
that a manufacturer-defendant's product is dangerous in its
ordinary use, and that no warning of its danger was given, a
presumption of defendant's knowledge of this danger arises,
and this presumption with, of course, proof of causation
and injury, completes the plaintiff's prima facie case. . . .
[I]t is up to the manufacturer-defendant to come forward,
if he can, with exculpatory evidence of its faultless ignorance
of the dangers of its product to those who might use it." •
With this use of the foreseeability rule, a manufacturer must have a
far-reaching imagination. He will not be free from liability by issuing
a warning to the retailer, if the retailer does not pass it along to the
ultimate consumer. There are many cases, however, which are com-
plicated and technical, and where foreseeability rests in a dim twilight
zone. As yet unresolved is the question: If the product is safe for
most persons, must a manufacturer also take cognizance of the idiosyn-
cracies of the remaining few?
THE DUTY TO WARN AND DIRECTION FOR USE
The Federal Hazardous Substance Labeling Act" was enacted
in 1960 and is administrated by the Food and Drug Administration in
the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The law is aimed
at the proper labeling of any product that is toxic, corrosive, irritant,
strongly sensitizing, flammable, or which generates pressure through
heat, combustion or other means. Laws relating to insecticides,
fungicides and rodenticides, passed years ago, also require proper
labeling. The duty to warn and the duty imposed under the direction
for use depend upon the foreseeability of danger to the user. The
labels of highly toxic substances are required to bear two words,
"DANGER—POISON," printed in type no smaller that the largest on
the label. A skull and crossbones must also appear either in red or a
contrasting color.
A problem arises with respect to those users who are allergic to
certain ingredients contained in the manufactured product. This prob-
lem is illustrated by the case of a manufacturer who sold 82 million
jars of a deodorant and received 373 complaints of dermatitis. The
court held that the formula need not be altered, but that there was a
definite duty to warn "those few persons who it knows cannot apply the
an Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228 F.2d 842, 849 (1st Cir. 1955).
87 74 Stat. 372 (1960), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-73 (Supp. IV, 1959-62).
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product without serious injury!'" In the court's opinion, the de-
fendant's argument based . on the improbability of injury bowed to
 superior argument for the necessity of giving notice. Of
course, if the manufacturer has actual (as opposed to merely imputed)
knowledge of the harmful characteristics of any ingredient, he has a
clear duty to warn.
The next issue concerns the adequacy of the warning. Mere
listing of the ingredient naphtha on the label of a solvent was held not
to be an adequate warning that the solvent was highly explosive."
Despite the common sense argument that "Where there is smoke there
is fire," an admonition that the user should keep a smoke-making
machine away froth the face does not suffice to warn him of the danger
of flame.4° The legend, "Caution Do Not Inhale Flames," was held
insufficient to warn of the dangers of carbon tetrachloride where the
prominently displayed trade name of the product was "SAFETY-
KLEEN." When a plaintiff read the caveat on the label "VOLATILE
SOLVENT—VAPOR HARMFUL—Use with adequate ventilation—
avoid prolonged or repeated contact with skin" and sued after being
poisoned while using the fluid, the court held that this solution, contain-
ing carbon tetrachloride, was so toxic that the jury could find the
warning inadequate." A label on a cement-base paint read "Caution:
Inasmuch as the alkalinity of Bondex may be irritating to tender or
sensitive skin, it is advisable to use a paddle for mixing." The plaintiff
lost the use of one eye when his father accidentally brushed it with
paint. It was held that the warning could be construed by the jury as
"as assurance that the only danger in the use of Bondex was that it
might have a slightly irritating effect upon a tender skin after prolonged
contact.""
Of equal importance in this area are the pamphlets or directions
for use which accompany the product. "The fact that directions are
overlooked or not meticulously followed does not relieve the manu-
facturer of the duty to warn of latent dangers common to a class of
articles!'" The facts in the case from which this statement is quoted
are most interesting. "Tag," a new spray, was designed to control and
eliminate from apple orchards a fungus called "scab." The plaintiff,
after applying this spray to his famed Albemarle County orchard to
eradicate the fungus from his trees, lost his entire crop. It was proved
38 Wright v. Carter Prods., Inc., supra note 25.
80 Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
40 Larrainendy v. Myers, 126 Cal. App. 2d 636, 272 P.2d 824 (1954).
41 Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945).
42 Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 1958).
48 Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958).
44 McClanahan v. California Spray-Chemical Corp., 194 Va. 842, 853, 75 S.E.2d
712, 718 (1953).
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that when applied to heavily infected trees, "Tag" caused the leaves to
drop, resulting in the destruction of the fruit. The defendant contended
it had discharged its duty to warn, and that the loss was occasioned by
the plaintiff's failure to follow directions properly. The jury awarded
plaintiff damages; the state supreme court affirmed. The plaintiff, never
conceding that he had failed to follow the directions, stressed the
ambiguities in the literature. The court held that the warning must be
directed toward those dangers which are reasonable and foreseeable,
including hazards to the object itself, and that deviations from the
directions are themselves a foreseeable contingency.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's task is made easier by use of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur or circumstantial evidence to prove the defendant's
negligence. Where res ipsa loquitur.is the method of proof relied upon,
the accident must be one that would not normally occur without
negligence, and where the instrumentalities, forces and conditions that
are the likely source of the trouble were under the management and
control of the defendant." Since a particular fact may be inferred from
another fact, a plaintiff is not even required to identify or prove the
conduct which was the proximate cause of the injuries sustained or
that it was unreasonable.
Despite the availability of these liberal methods of proof, it is
still held that where the danger is apparent, there is ordinarily no duty
to warn." Whether the plaintiff is to be charged with knowledge of the
danger must be determined by reference to the experience of the class
of persons most likely to use the produce? Thus a cement product may
be dangerous when distributed to an average household consumer, who
is not familiar with the dangers of lime." A similar preparation,
distributed to those in the building trade, who know of lime's caustic
qualities, needs no accompanying warning." The modern trend is to
require a manufacturer to warn the customers of familiar hazards and
even to anticipate the forgetfulness of customers expected to use the
produce°
Although this comment includes the leading cases in the area,
there are many others reaching similar results. The cases were selected
because of the generally known product involved. The manufacturer's
45 Sitta v. American Steel & Wire Div., 254 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1958).
40 Nisbida v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 245 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1957).
47 Parker v. State, 280 App. Div. 191, 112 N.Y.S.2d 693 (1952), holding that
physicians should know the nature of their purchases of medical supplies and need not
be warned of possible dangers.
48 Haberly v. Reardon Co., supra note 43.
49 Katz v. Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 115 A.2d 731 (1959).
5° Abbott Labs. v. Lapp, 78 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1935).
592
COMMENTS
duty to warn depends upon the foreseeability of the danger, whether
known or unknown, for it is felt that the experts who manufacture or
assemble products should know all the possible dangers of its use. One
of the most widely expanding areas of products liability arises out of
the duties to warn and to promulgate adequate direction for use. This
area has been aptly called "A New Frontier," 5 ' in our American
jurisprudence.
51 Condon, Products Liability—A New Frontier, 2 Federation of Insurance Counsel
(1961).
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